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Abstract
Basing ourselves on the writings of Hans Jonas, we offer to psychosomatic medicine a philosophy of life that sur-
mounts the mind-body dualism which has plagued Western thought since the origins of modern science in seven-
teenth century Europe. Any present-day account of reality must draw upon everything we know about the living
and the non-living. Since we are living beings ourselves, we know what it means to be alive from our own first-
hand experience. Therefore, our philosophy of life, in addition to starting with what empirical science tells us about
inorganic and organic reality, must also begin from our own direct experience of life in ourselves and in others; it
can then show how the two meet in the living being. Since life is ultimately one reality, our theory must reinte-
grate psyche with soma such that no component of the whole is short-changed, neither the objective nor the
subjective. In this essay, we lay out the foundational components of such a theory by clarifying the defining fea-
tures of living beings as polarities. We describe three such polarities:
1) Being vs. non-being: Always threatened by non-being, the organism must constantly re-assert its being through
its own activity.
2) World-relatedness vs. self-enclosure: Living beings are both enclosed with themselves, defined by the boundaries
that separate them from their environment, while they are also ceaselessly reaching out to their environment and
engaging in transactions with it.
3) Dependence vs. independence: Living beings are both dependent on the material components that constitute
them at any given moment and independent of any particular groupings of these components over time.
We then discuss important features of the polarities of life: Metabolism; organic structure; enclosure by a semi-
permeable membrane; distinction between “self” and “other"; autonomy; neediness; teleology; sensitivity; values.
Moral needs and values already arise at the most basic levels of life, even if only human beings can recognize such
values as moral requirements and develop responses to them.
The Evolution of a Method for Studying Life
Psychosomatic medicine requires a philosophy that sur-
mounts mind-body dualism. Such a dualism has plagued
Western thought since the origins of modern science
in seventeenth century Europe. In its youth modern
science perhaps needed to separate mind from body in
order to separate religious concerns from scientific ones.
If religion was concerned mainly with the human soul,
then Descartes’ claim that the human soul (res cogitans)
differed in toto from physical reality (res extensa)
implied that the science of physics had no relevance for
the human soul. As long as science promised not to
encroach on discussions of the human soul, it found
itself free to investigate physical matter in an entirely
new way. Hence modern science could abandon the
Aristotelian conception of nature that the Catholic
Church continued to advocate because science conceded
to the Church a monopoly on all questions of the spirit.
Metaphysical dualism thus won a tolerance for new
modes of thought by parceling reality out to two entirely
separate conceptual systems, one theological and the
other scientific and mathematical [1-3].
This peaceful co-existence of theology and science was
always threatened by deep strains, however, because
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warring monisms. Repeated failures to explain the rela-
tionship between mind and body made dualism seem
implausible because it was obvious from our own daily
experience that mind and body were intimately united.
But since dualism had insisted on an absolute difference
between mind and body, philosophers and theologians
felt themselves forced to take either one side or the
other. Materialists would insist that physical nature
alone had true being and that mind was mere appear-
ance. Idealists would counter by deeming mind the sole
reality and everything physical a mere idea thought by
mind. In struggling thus to overcome dualism material-
ists and idealists simply presupposed the options dual-
ism forced upon them. For each monism took it for
granted that the only alternatives for defining reality
were either matter or mind. Nothing else seemed con-
ceivable [1].
Darwin’s theory of evolution, however, undermined the
peace that metaphysical dualism had sought to establish.
Darwinian Theory explained the human soul as having
evolved through the same regular processes of chance
mutation and natural selection that had produced all
other living beings. Hence the human soul was incorpo-
rated back into the animal kingdom, and as a conse-
quence the soul required no other explanation than that
which science could now offer. Empirical science thereby
became universal: all of reality could be understood in
the same basic scientific terms and laws [4,5].
This universalizing of scientific conceptualization
seemed to betoken the victory of metaphysical material-
ism. If all of reality could be explained by science, then
all of reality could ultimately be explained in terms of
the most basic constituents that science had uncovered,
namely, inorganic matter. Hence we need not speak of
“mind,”“ spirit,” or “soul” anymore except to demon-
strate how even these subjective appearances could be
accounted for fully by a law-governed physical causality.
But, as Hans Jonas has shown [4], there is another way
to interpret the incorporation of the whole human being
back into scientific theory. If, in this post-Darwinian
age, we must now account for everything living and
non-living in a unified system of thought, then we
should be able to draw on everything we know about
the living and non-living in our account of reality. This
should include everything that we encounter of the liv-
ing and non-living in our own direct experience. And
here we can claim privileged access: since we are living
beings ourselves, we know what it means to be alive from
our own first-hand experience. Every moment of our
waking lives we directly experience life, life in ourselves
and in others. Our most intimate experience of life is in
our own individual lives. But this constant experience of
our own being-alive makes it possible for us to make
sense of the being-alive of other people and, to some
extent, of animals. Hence we should be able to start
from both sides – from the side of what empirical
science can tell us about inorganic and organic reality
and from the side of our own direct experience of life in
ourselves and in others - and show how the two meet in
the living being. If dualism has been undermined, then
we must strive for a unified understanding of life, an
understanding that fully appreciates both the biological
processes of the organism and the inward, felt experi-
ences of being-alive. Hence, aiming at their intersection,
we shall reason from both directions. We do this in the
confidence that life is ultimately one reality, however
complex. Human beings are psychosomatic wholes,a n d
therefore a theory that reintegrates psyche with soma
can be developed as long as no component of the whole
is short-changed. We shall search for features that char-
acterize life as such,w h e t h e r“objective” or “subjective.”
These features of living beings in general emerge, in our
view, as polarities. Living beings exist as suspended
between opposite poles of reality. We shall now attempt
to describe some of these vital polarities [4].
Polarities of Life
The existence of every living being is sustained through
metabolism. Unlike inorganic matter, the very being of a
living entity is contingent upon its own ceaseless activity
[1]. As a result the existence of the organism from
moment to moment is its own dynamic achievement.
Inorganic matter need not actively do anything in order
to endure as the being it is, but organisms must. This
inescapable need to persistently bring about their own
continuation through their own metabolic functioning
proves that organisms are threatened beings: if they do
not actively achieve and repeatedly re-achieve their own
reality, they die. Ceaselessly dependent on their own
functioning for their survival, organisms hang suspended
over the abyss of non-being. Hence we can acknowledge
one of the polarities that define life: always threatened
by non-being the organism must constantly re-assert its
being through its own activity [6-8].
This activity, however, must be an organized activity.
Metabolic processes are structured p r o c e s s e s ,a n di ti s
this very structure and the processes it channels that
must be maintained as such. When the structure fails to
determine the direction of the processes, the organism
dies. Accordingly, the identity of the organism depends
on the maintenance of its internal structure. We might
even say that the identity of the organism is the identity
of the structure. This becomes more obvious when we
note that the components that constitute the organism
a r ec o n s t a n t l yc h a n g i n g .T h em a t e r i a lc o m p o n e n t so f
the organism come and go, but it is important that the
organism remain as the same one. To “remain as the
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midst of constant change of components. In order to
maintain this constant change of its components, how-
ever, the organism must to some extent be open to its
e n v i r o n m e n t ,t h eu l t i m a t es o u r c eo ft h ec o m p o n e n t s .
We are now in a position to appreciate one of the dis-
tinctive polarities of living beings. Living beings are both
enclosed within themselves, defined by the boundaries
that separate them from their environment, while they
are also ceaselessly reaching out to their environment
and transacting with it [7]. This polarity is found even
in the single cell.
On the one hand, the cell membrane determines the
cell’s boundaries: the reality of the cell extends no
farther than this membrane. And indeed these bound-
aries must be maintained if the cell is to continue to be.
If the membrane breaks down sufficiently, the cell dies.
Hence the membrane must maintain the separation of
the cell from the rest of reality. Death consists in the
loss of this separation. This need to remain bounded
and distinct from that which is outside is observed at all
levels of organic life. From the single cell, through the
different organs of animal bodies, to the level of human
beings as whole persons, “self” and “other” are definitely
distinguished [6]. This distinction between self and
other is demonstrated most clearly, of course, in the
immune system. The immune system is geared to detect
what is non-self; and once this detection of otherness
occurs, the immune system actively opposes the invader.
On the other hand, the membrane is semi-permeable
so that the cell may continually exchange its material
with realities outside of it. Literally through its mem-
brane the cell metabolically interacts with that which is
not itself. Indeed this interaction with other entities is
necessary if the cell is to maintain its existence: the cell
is physically dependent upon the outside for its conti-
nuation in being. This dependency on what is not itself
in order to survive evinces the organism’s neediness:
lacking self-sufficiency, the living being must of neces-
sity acquire the means for its existence from its environ-
ment. However, this unavoidable exposure to the
environment, born out of need, manifests again the ris-
kiness of organic existence. The environment can prove
harmful and even deadly. The alien and uncontrollable
nature of the environment poses an additional threat to
the already precarious venture that is organic life. Hence
the cell is both enclosed within its own boundaries in
order to maintain its separate and autonomous being
while it must also interact with outside realities and
indeed even exchange its own matter with them [6].
Through the metabolic exchange of material compo-
nents the cell undergoes ceaseless change in its physico-
chemical make-up. But this change is, as we have seen,
an organized change: it is determined by the internal
structure of the cell. Through the change, then, the cell
maintains its own separate identity while it also changes
the physicochemical parts that compose it. It is both in
flux and stable. Maintaining its stable identity through
ceaseless turnover in its material constituents, the being
of the organism is both independent of and dependent
on these constituents. Some material constituents are
always necessary for the existence of the organism;
hence the dependence of the organism. But since these
constituents will eventually be exchanged for others as
the organism continues to live, the organism is indepen-
dent of precisely these constituents, i.e., of whichever
constituents compose it at any given time. We can
therefore recognize one of the other polarities of living
beings: they are both dependent on the material compo-
nents that constitute them at any given moment and
independent of any particular groupings of these compo-
nents across time [6,7]. This polarity of dependence and
independence always permeates organic existence.
As we have said, the metabolic activity of the organism
is geared toward sustaining the existence of the organ-
ism. This being geared toward the sustaining of its own
being shows that the metabolism of the organism is “for
t h es a k eo f ” its own continuation in being. The being
that the activity is geared toward preserving is the organ-
ism’s future being. The metabolic functioning is for the
sake of bridging the temporal gap that separates the
organism in the present from its own existence in
the future. In slightly different terms, metabolic activity
serves the temporal enduring of the organism. Hence it is
temporal duration that poses the main threat to the
organism’s contingent existence: the question of whether
the organism will endure from moment to moment
always remains an unanswered question until the future
becomes the present and the organism still lives. And the
threat can be defeated only if the activity of metabolism
is sustained. Life is thus teleological: the present activity
of the living being aims at its own future being [8,9].
If we can speak of the metabolic activity of the organ-
ism as occurring “for the sake of” the organism’s future
being, this means that at some fundamental level the
organism posits its own continuation in reality as a
“good.” In other words, the organism posits its own exis-
tence as having a positive value. Value is thus built into
t h er e a l i t yo fo r g a n i cl i f e :i ti so r g a n i cl i f ei t s e l ft h a t
places value there. It is not human beings and certainly
not human agency that introduces value into an other-
wise value-free universe. Living beings themselves, by
striving to preserve themselves, already signal that, at
least for the being involved, its own life is a good [10-12].
We can see, then, that the values that motivate medical
practice are grounded in organic life itself. While only
human beings can develop and practice medical treat-
ment, it is not human beings who introduce into the
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Living beings themselves posit the goodness of an activity
that prevents death and alleviates suffering. If for the
organism its own continuation is good, then its death
would be bad. Hence the moral need to combat death
issues from the organism’s own internal striving. And
therefore the need to treat and hopefully cure the ill
o r g a n i s ms ot h a ti td o e sn o td i e-a tl e a s tn o tb e f o r ei t s
naturally allotted time - is based on a value that the
organism itself posits. The same would be true for suffer-
ing and pain, at least for those organism’st h a tc a nfeel.
Felt suffering and pain are posited by the organism feel-
ing them as bad. Hence the moral need to relieve and
even eradicate pain through medical treatment arises at
the most basic levels of life, even if only human beings
can recognize this value as a moral requirement and
develop the medical techniques to respond to it [11,13].
The historian of biology, Georges Canguilheim, also
insists on this positive value of health and negative
value of illness as posited by the organism itself and not
simply through some external judgment conceived by
medical practitioners [14]. Canguilheim finds this eva-
luation rendered by living beings themselves to underlie
the fundamental distinction between the “normal” and
the “pathological” states of the organism. Medicine sim-
ply draws on this basic distinction rendered by life itself
on itself in developing scientific and technical means for
treating them. Canguilheim writes,
We think that medicine exists as the art of life
because the living human being himself calls certain
dreaded states or behaviors pathological (hence
requiring avoidance or correction) relative to the
dynamic polarity of life, in the form of a negative
value. We think that in doing this the living human
being, in a more or less lucid way, extends a sponta-
neous effort, peculiar to life, to struggle against that
which obstructs its preservation and development
taken as norms.... the fact that a living man reacts to
a lesion, infection, functional anarchy by means of a
disease expresses the fundamental fact that life is
not indifferent to the conditions in which it is possi-
ble, that life is polarity and thereby even an uncon-
scious positing of value; in short, life is in fact a
normative activity [[14], pps. 338-339].
S i n c ew eh a v em e n t i o n e dfeeling, we would like to
conclude by indicating its importance for any philoso-
phy of life. Although it is difficult to pinpoint the pre-
cise level, at some level of life the organism’s
relationship with the world becomes a relationship of
feeling: many organisms are sensitive to elements in
their environments. Again this applies to individual cells
as well as to conglomerates of cells and whole
organisms. Sensitivity is the first glimmering of subjec-
tivity in organisms, if we may apply the word “subjectiv-
ity” to even the most primitive and elemental kinds of
feeling. And as we move up the living kingdom to more
and more complex organisms, sensitivity too becomes
more complex; and at a certain point we can speak of
organisms perceiving items composing the environment.
It would, of course, be difficult to mark the progressive
difference between an elemental sensitivity to the out-
side and an actual perception of it, for any form of felt
sensitivity may already count as an experience, at least of
av e r yb a s i cs o r t .O u rp o i n th e r ei s ,h o w e v e r ,t h a tt h e
first glimmerings of subjectivity arise relatively early in
the phylogenetic scale. And once subjectivity appears, it
grows in complexity, refinement, and acuity. “Mind,”
then, is certainly not the exclusive privilege of human
beings. It is not even the exclusive possession of the
higher animals. Mental life begins where sensitivity to
the outside is felt [8,15].
This birth of subjectivity marks another aspect of the
selfhood of living beings. For as subjectivity grows and
becomes more complex, the organism is able to sense
its environment across spatial distances and to feel a
desire for things across time. If we add to this subjectiv-
ity the movement of the organism’s body, then the living
being can move across the spatial distances and purse
objects as long as desires for them are felt. With grow-
ing experience and motility, then, livings beings confront
a world that grows in its spatial extent and its temporal
duration. Mind renders organic world-relatedness richer
and more encompassing, even if this larger exposure to
the outside also expands the realm from which threats
to life can emerge [15].
Drawing extensively on the philosophy of life of Hans
Jonas, we have traced the development of living forms
from their most basic constituents up to the more com-
plex forms in which mental life, with an increasing span
of feeling, desire, and perception, connect the living
organism with an increasing variety of things and events,
things and events which both nurture and threaten it. In
subsequent essays we shallp r o v i d eam o r ea m p l ec o n -
ception of how human life enriches and changes this
development through the construction and assimilation
of culture. However, we hope that the present sketch
furnishes the fundamentals for a unified understanding
of life that avoids mind-body dualism. Such an under-
standing, we maintain, is essential for a psychosomatic
medicine that can encompass all the factors that affect
health and illness.
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